Commonwealth v. Culbreth: Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas by Ulsh, James A.
Volume 75 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 75, 
1970-1971 
6-1-1971 
Commonwealth v. Culbreth: Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty 
Pleas 
James A. Ulsh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
James A. Ulsh, Commonwealth v. Culbreth: Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas, 75 DICK. L. REV. 608 
(1971). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol75/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Notes
COMMONWEALTH v. CULBRETH: PRE-SENTENCE
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS
In Commonwealth v. Culbreth' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to allow a defendant leave to withdraw a plea of
guilty and enter a plea of not guilty to the crime of murder. The
motion to withdraw the guilty plea had originally been made after
the plea had been accepted by the trial judge2 but before the de-
fendant was sentenced. The court held that only when a manifest
abuse of discretion is shown will the decision of a lower court refus-
ing to allow a defendant leave to withdraw a plea of guilty be re-
versed on appeal.8
1. 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970).
2. PA. R. Csnvi. Psoc. 319(a) provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The judge may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty and shall not accept it unless he determines after inquiry of
the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly
made. Such inquiry shall appear on the record.
The comments to Rule 319 suggest that at least the following questions be
asked of the defendant:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
which he is pleading guilty?
(2) What acts defendant performed and whether these acts consti-
tute the crime charged?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to trial by
jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent
until he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences
and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware of any plea bargain or other arrange-
ment?
(7) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by any plea
bargain or other arrangement between defense counsel and at-
torney for the Commonwealth?
3. 439 Pa. 21, 28, 264 A.2d 643, 646 (1970).
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In a dissenting opinion 4 written by Justice Roberts, a minority
of the court questioned the standards which the majority applied in
ruling that in this particular case the defendant should not be per-
mitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Referring to the applicable
standards which have been promulgated by the federal courts5 and
suggested by the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice,6 the dissenters asked the court to recognize a distinction
between pre-sentence and post-sentence plea withdrawals and for-
mulate a more liberal policy governing pre-sentence withdrawals.
This Note will discuss the federal and ABA Minimum Standards
approach to the problem of pre-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
in order to ascertain whether any appreciable distinction can be
drawn between those approaches and the approach taken by the
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Culbreth. This Note will also discuss whether an application of the
ostensibly liberal language of the federal courts and the ABA Mini-
mum Standards would have necessitated a different result in Com-
monwealth v. Culbreth.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING OF COMMONWEALTH V. CULBRETH
The defendant in Culbreth7 had decided to plead guilty to a gen-
eral charge of murder on the day his case was scheduled for trial.
In the presence of his court appointed counsel the defendant was
questioned on the record by the trial judge as to the voluntariness
and intelligence of the plea;' the court then entered a plea of guilty.
After hearing testimony the trial judge concluded that the degree of
guilt did not rise above second degree murder. A pre-sentence in-
vestigation was ordered. Several months later the defendant peti-
tioned the court for leave to withdraw his guilty plea. The petition
was dismissed and the defendant was sentenced to from six to
twelve years.
On appeal the defendant contended that the trial court abused
its discretion in dismissing his petition for leave to withdraw his plea
of guilty. Immediately before the defendant had decided to plead
guilty his trial counsel, an assistant district attorney, and the trial
judge had met in the judge's chambers; when they returned the de-
4. Id. at 29, 264 A.2d at 646 (dissenting opinion).
5. See, e.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927); Kadwell
v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. FED. R. Cnmw. P. 32(d).
6. ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS or GUILTY
(Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter referred to as ABA MINIMuM STAND-
ARDS].
7. 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970).
8. See note 2 supra.
fendant changed his plea to guilty. The defendant contended that
he was under the misapprehension that his attorney and the assist-
ant district attorney had agreed that he would receive a maximum
sentence of two years if he plead guilty. Because the judge had in-
vited the parties to his chambers, the defendant contended that he
was led to believe that the judge had acquiesed in the bargain. The
defendant's attorney testified that he may have misled the defend-
ant into believing that the probabilities were good that the trial
judge would follow the district attorney's recommendations as to
the sentence to be imposed. The assistant district attorney did
make a recommendation to the judge that a maximum sentence of
two years be imposed. To these contentions the supreme court re-
plied:
[0] ur review of the part of the record which dealt with the
examination of the defendant by both his trial counsel and
the trial judge makes it abundantly clear that the defend-
ant knew that no promises have been made by the court,
and that the court was not bound by any of the discussion
that had taken placeY
His reason for attempting to withdraw his plea was labeled as "dis-
appointment in the length of sentence imposed." 10  This language
was used even though the original motion was made before the de-
fendant knew what his sentence would be.
II. LEAVE TO WITHDRAW A PLEA OF GUILTY IN PENNSYLVANIA-
WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
The procedure in Pennsylvania regarding the granting of a mo-
tion for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentencing is gov-
erned by Rule 320 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:
At any time before sentence the court may in its dis-
cretion permit or direct a plea of guilty to be withdrawn
and a plea of not guilty substituted. 11
The granting of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty lies solely
within the discretion of the trial court. 12 The trial court's decision
will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion or
error of law which controlled the decision. 13 If the plea is found to
9. 439 Pa. 21, 27, 264 A.2d 643, 646 (1970).
10. Id.
11. PA. R. CalM. P. 320. Rule 320 repealed the Act of April 15, 1907,
P.L. 62, § 1 as amended, Act of June 15, 1939, P.L. 400, § 1 which provided
that a defendant could withdraw his plea of guilty at any time before sen-
tence, by leave of the court.
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Batley, 436 Pa. 377, 260 A.2d 793 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964); Commonwealth
v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 218, 195 A.2d 338 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540,
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Rivers v. Meyers,
414 Pa. 439, 200 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964); Commonwealth v.
Lynch, 210 Pa. Super. 172, 231 A.2d 880 (1967).
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have been knowingly and intelligently entered, the trial court's re-
fusal to allow withdrawal will be affirmed.14 In the hands of the
trial court, motions for withdrawal of guilty pleas can be liberally
granted; 15 but on appeal refusal to allow withdrawal will seldom be
reversed.' 6
In Commonwealth v. Scoleri17 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
set forth the following illustrations of when withdrawal of a guilty
plea should be granted:
The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is properly allowed (a)
where it has been entered in ignorance of the nature of the
crime with which the defendant has been charged and the
consequences of his plea, or (b) where the plea of guilty
was not made fully and voluntarily, or (c) where the plea
was entered by mistake or without the consent of the de-
fendant or (d) where the plea was entered by an uncoun-
selled defendant in a homicide case, or in a felony case in
which the defendant was indigent or was refused counsel,
(citations omitted) or (e) where the plea was induced by
fraud or threats or justifiable fear or (f) where a trial or
hearing judge has made, but has not kept, a promise or com-
mitment which induced the plea or (g) where because of
very unusual circumstances the court believes that justice
will best be served by submitting the case to the jury.
18
Refusal to allow withdrawal when any of these circumstances sur-
rounds the entry of a guilty plea should be considered an abuse of
discretion.' 9 However, if the record refutes the existence of any of
the above factors, a defendant may be denied the privilege of with-
drawing his guilty plea and the denial may be upheld on appeal.
20
14. Cf. Commonwealth v. Metz, 425 Pa. 188, 191, 228 A.2d 729, 731
(1967); see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Meyers, 423 Pa. 1, 222 A.2d
918 (1966); Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 183 Pa. Super. 417, 133 A.2d 288
(1957).
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 69 Lack. Jur. 124 (Pa. 1968).
16. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Batley, 436 Pa. 377, 260 A.2d 793 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540, cert. denied, 391 U.S.
920 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Rivers v. Meyers, 414 Pa. 439, 200 A.2d
303, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa.
137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
17. 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).
18. Id. at 247-48, 202 A.2d at 536. See also Commonwealth v. Phelan,
427 Pa. 265, 274, 234 A.2d 540, 546 (1967). In Commonwealth v. Evans,
434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969), the supreme court extended the defendant's
right to withdraw a guilty plea to situations where the trial judge openly
participates in a sentencing arrangement before an agreement has been
reached between the prosecution and the defense as to the sentence to be
recommended to the court. See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540, cert. denied, 391 U.S.
920 (1967); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).
20. Commonwealth v. Dillinger, 440 Pa. 336, 338, n.4, 269 A.2d 505,
507, n.4 (1970).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held where an accused
pleads guilty relying on the opinion of his trial counsel as to the
probable Commonwealth sentence recommendation and the concur-
rence of the trial judge therewith, the accused will not be permitted
to withdraw his plea on the grounds that he was ill advised. 21 There
is a certain degree of calculated risk involved when an accused de-
cides to enter a plea of guilty. The possibility of leniency is usually
a very important consideration. Miscalculation of the trial judge's
predisposition in regard to the penalty to be imposed, when not in-
duced by statements made by the prosecuting attorney or the trial
judge2 2 should not affect the validity of the plea.23  In Common-
wealth v. Kirkland24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
The fact that in the finding of the Court as to the degree
of defendant's guilt and the sentence imposed the expecta-
tions or hopes of the appellant or her counsel were not real-
ized is not the kind of mistake or misapprehension which
in the interest of justice, justifies the withdrawal of a plea
of guilty.
2 5
Under such circumstances the court held that there was no abuse
of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant
leave to withdraw her guilty plea. 6
If a defendant seeks to rely on misleading statements made by
his atttorney as grounds for withdrawing his guilty plea supporting
evidence must appear on the record. In Commonwealth v. Lynch
27
the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to allow the defendant to
withdraw his plea of guilty before sentence upon an allegation of
misunderstanding as to the judge's acquiescence in the district attor-
ney's sentence recommendation. The defendant alleged that at a
conference between his defense counsel, an assistant district attor-
ney, and the trial judge, the judge promised to impose a sentence
to run concurrently with a jail sentence previously imposed. This
allegation was denied by the judge. A concurrent sentence was
21. Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959). See also
Commonwealth ex rel. Mercer v. Banmiller, 193 Super. 411, 165 A.2d 121
(1960). In Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964), the
supreme court classified inadequate grounds for withdrawal as follows:
[T]here is no legal justification for the withdrawal of a plea of
guilty which is entered (a) under the belief that as a result of
such plea he will receive life imprisonment or lenient treatment (b)
where he and his lawyer had erroneously drawn the conclusion
that he will not receive a penalty of death or a severe penalty or
(c) where his lawyer and the District Attorney have agreed upon
the exact crime which he has committed and the penalty to be im-
posed.
415 Pa. at 248, 202 A.2d at 536.
22. See, Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Senauskas, 326 Pa. 69, 191 A. 167 (1937); Common-
wealth v. Todd, 86 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174 (1958). See also notes
35-42 and accompanying text infra.
23. Cf. Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338 (1963).
24. 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338 (1963).
25. Id. at 56, 195 A.2d at 341-42.
26. Id. at 57, 195 A.2d at 342.
27. 210 Pa. Super. 172, 231 A.2d 880 (1967).
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
originally imposed but, as a result of the post-sentence investigation,
the defendant was called for re-sentencing. At this time he asked
for leave to withdraw his guilty plea. This motion was denied and
the defendant was given a consecutive sentence. The defendant
contended that even if the judge had not in fact promised to impose
a concurrent sentence, his counsel misled him into believing that
the judge had made a commitment. The superior court found no
evidence on the record that the defense counsel told the defendant
that the judge had promised to impose a concurrent sentence. 2 The
record showed that the defense attorney knew that the judge could
make no commitments until all of the facts of the case were made
known to him.
29
Commonwealth v. Lynch presumes a distinction which must be
drawn between cases in which defense counsel expresses a belief
as to the court's position which later proves to be erroneous, and
cases in which counsel states to the accused that the court has prom-
ised that it will impose a lenient sentence. In the former case an
accused will never be able to reverse the lower court's refusal to
allow withdrawal 0 In the later case if the accused can present
sufficient facts in support of his allegation, his guilty plea should
be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered. The distinction
manifests a reluctance to provide a liberal procedure for a defendant
to withdraw his guilty plea because of his disappointment with the
sentence of the trial court. In most cases the defendant's miscalcu-
lation as to the expected sentence will not become apparent until
after sentence has been imposed.31 However, when a pre-sentence
investigation is ordered, as in Culbreth, the defendant may learn
of the judge's decision during the pre-sentence investigation. In
such a situation the defendant's petition for withdrawal prior to
actual sentencing should not affect the result. It is immaterial
when, during the criminal procedure, hindsight affords the defend-
ant a realization of his miscalculation.
If the defendant's misapprehension concerning the sentence to
be imposed is the result of statements made by either the trial judge
or the district attorney a different conclusion is possible. A guilty
plea may be the result of an agreement between defense counsel
and the prosecuting attorney.8 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
28. Id. at 177, 231 A.2d at 883.
29. Id.
30. Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 24 (1959).
31. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lynch, 210 Pa. Super. 172, 231 A.2d 880
(1967).
32. Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d
699 (1966). In regard to the benefits of plea agreements, the court stated:
has held that the existence of a plea bargain alone will not invali-
date a guilty plea. 3  A prosecuting attorney may agree to recom-
mend a lighter sentence, to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or to dismiss other pending charges.8 4 If a prose-
cuting attorney agrees to make one of the above recommendations
but fails to comply with his promise at the time of sentencing, the
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if made in
reliance upon the prosecuting attorney's promise.25
A judge may never participate in any way in the negotiation
of a plea agreement.3 6 Any attempt to do so will invalidate the
plea.3 7 The pressure placed on the defendant by the judge's role in
the bargaining inevitably taints the plea, regardless of whether the
judge fulfills his part of the bargain.38 In Commonwealth v. Evans
3s
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a guilty plea which
was induced by an agreement between counsel for the defendant, the
district attorney, and the court to the effect that if the defendant
pled guilty to all five of the bills of indictment against him, the
judge would sentence him on only one of the bills. The decision
adopts section 3.3 of the ABA Minimum Standards forbidding par-
ticipation by the trial judge in the initial plea bargaining process, as
the law of Pennsylvania.4 0 Section 3.3 also provides that the trial
judge may be informed of the final bargain once it has been reached
and before the guilty plea is formally offered. The trial judge must
From the Commonwealth's viewpoint the inability to bargain
would lead to a substantial increase in required manpower prose-
cutional and in the number of necessary trials even though a satis-
factory resolution of the state's interest can often be obtained with
less than the potential maximum punishment available.
From the accused's viewpoint, the abolition of plea bargaining
might be disastrous for there would be little incentive for the state
to acquiesce in less than the maximum available punishment ...
Even when the evidence, although not overwhelming is more than
sufficient to sustain a conviction it may well be in the defendant's
best interest to plead guilty rather than to gamble a loss, when
losing may result in the deprivation of liberty for an extended pe-
riod of time or the death sentence.
Id. at 347-48, 223 A.2d at 704-05.
33. Commonwealth v. McCauley, 428 Pa. 107, 237 A.2d 204 (1968);
Commonwealth ex tel. Bostic v. Cavell, 424 Pa. 573, 227 A.2d 662 (1967).
PA. R. Cn-M. P. 319(b) impliedly condones plea bargaining by pro-
viding:
The court, with the consent of the attorney for the Commonwealth
may accept a plea of guilty to any included offense or to any
count in an indictment and may discharge the defendant on the
other offenses or counts charged.
34. Commonwealth ex tel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 345, 223
A.2d 699, 703 (1967); see also, § 3.1 ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968).
35. Commonwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. super. 272, 142 A.2d 174 (1958).
36. United States ex Tel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 319 (2d
Cir. 1963); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969); Com-
monwealth ex tel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
37. Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969).
38. Id. See also United States ex Tel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp.
244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
39. 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969).
40. Id. at 55, 252 A.2d at 690.
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either acquiesce in the bargain or give the defendant the opportunity
to withdraw his plea if he does not agree with the bargain. 41 Sec-
tion 3.3 of the ABA Minimum Standards was adopted in toto.
42
The supreme court also held:
Moreover, if a judge refuses to accept a plea bargain agreed
to by the defense and the Commonwealth or if a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn because the trial
judge decides that his original agreement was inappropriate
then the trial should be held where practical before an-
other judge who has no knowledge of the prior plea bargain-
ing.
43
If the trial judge promises to impose the sentence agreed upon but
fails to comply with his promise at the time of sentencing, the plea
is rendered invalid.
44
The time interval which has elapsed between the entry of the
guilty plea and the accused's first attempt to withdraw the plea mayi
be an important factor to consider when determining whether the
accused is asking to withdraw for a legitimate purpose or only be-
cause of his disappointment with the court's position in regard to
punishment.45 A petition for leave to withdraw which is filed
shortly after entry of the plea would also create less prejudice to
the Commonwealth if a trial is subsequently granted.46 The initial
attempt to withdraw need not be in the form of a petition to the trial
court but may be an informal request to the police, the district at-
41. ABA MINIMUM STANDARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY
(Approved Draft 1968) § 3.3 (b) provides:
If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the expectation that
other charges before the court will be dismissed or that sentence
concession will be granted, upon request of the parties the trial
judge may permit the disclosure to him of the tentative agreement
and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the
plea. He may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and de-
fense counsel whether he will concur in the proposed disposition
if the information in the pre-sentence report is consistent with
the representations made to him. If the trial judge concurs, but
later decides that the final disposition should not include the charge
or sentence concessions contemplated by the agreement, he shall so
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either af-
firm or withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
42. Id.
43. 434 Pa. 52, 56-57, 252 A.2d 689, 691 (1969).
44. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Senauskas, 326 Pa. 69, 191 A. 167
(1937).
45. Cf. Commonwealth v. Turchetta, 404 Pa. 41, 171 A.2d 54 (1961).
46. But see, Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940). Usu-
ally, the sooner withdrawal is requested, the greater the chances are that
the government has done nothing to its detriment in reliance on the plea.
In this case, however, within 3 days of the entry of the plea, 43 witnesses
were dismissed.
torney or defense counsel, or an assertion of innocence.4 7 In Com-
monwealth v. Turchetta48 the defendant made five attempts to with-
draw his plea of guilty. Four attempts were made before sentenc-
ing. One-half hour after the defendant signed the indictment he
asked his attorney and the district attorney what he had signed and
stated that he did not wish to plead guilty. Fourteen months later
the defendant formally petitioned the court to change his plea. The
Commonwealth contended that the defendant's petition was not
filed in a timely manner and reflected only the defendant's fear that
his sentence expectations would not be met. In holding that the
trial court abused its discretion by disallowing withdrawal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, "We should not be ingenious to
find reasons to deny a man his trial by jury when he presses for it
before trial.
49
The Commonwealth has no burden of proof when a guilty plea
is entered.50 Any testimony received is used only as an aid to the
court in passing sentence. 51 If the defendant's evidence or testi-
mony, if believed, would create a doubt as to the accused's actual
guilt, the guilty plea should be withdrawn and a trial should be
scheduled.52 In Commonwealth v. DiPau53 the superior court
stated that a guilty plea is of questionable validity, "where it ap-
pears that the plea was entered through a misapprehension of the
facts or the law; where there is doubt of the defendant's guilt, or
where the defendant has a defense worthy of consideration by a
jury. . . ."5 If any of the above circumstances are clear from an
inspection of the record, it will be an abuse of discretion to deny
withdrawal. 55 However, the defendant's burden of proof on any of
these grounds for withdrawal will be extremely difficult if, at the
time of entry, the defendant was represented by counsel and a judi-
cial inquiry concerning the intelligence and voluntariness of the
plea appears on the record. 56
47. Cf. Commonwealth v. Turchetta, 404 Pa. 41, 171 A.2d 54 (1961).
48. 404 Pa. 41, 171 A.2d 4 (1961).
49. Id. at 47, 171 A.2d at 57.
50. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33, 16 A.2d 50 (1940);
Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 183 Pa. Super. 417, 133 A.2d 288 (1957).
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 183 Pa. Super. 417, 133
A.2d 288 (1957).
52. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757
(1968); Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 183 Pa. Super. 417, 133 A.2d 288
(1957).
53. 122 Pa. Super. 53, 184 A. 480 (1936).
54. Id. at 55, 184 A. at 481.
55. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 183 Pa. Super. 417, 133
A.2d 288 (1957); cf. Commonwealth v. Metz, 425 Pa. 188, 228 A.2d 729
(1967).
56. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540,
cert. denied, 391 U.S 920 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Rivers v. Myers,
414 Pa. 439, 220 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964); Commonwealth
ex rel. Mercer v. Banmiller, 193 Pa. Super. 412, 165 A.2d 121 (1960).
Compare Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964) in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed withdrawal because the
unusual facts of the case made it impossible to determine what the defend-
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III. THE FEDERAL PROCEDURE--WITHDRAWAL FOR
ANY FAIR AND JUST REASON
Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v.
Culbreth57 placed great emphasis upon the withdrawal procedure
applicable in the federal courts.58 It was Justice Roberts' view that,
prior to sentencing leave to withdraw should be allowed
whenever the defendant advances any fair and just reason
for withdrawal, unless the Commonwealth can show that it
was substantially prejudiced by its reliance on the defend-
ant's guilty plea.59
The dissenting justices believed that the defendant had advanced
a fair and just reason in that:
He first believed that the Judge had agreed to a plea bar-
gain for a two year sentence, but later realized that the
judge was not informed of and did not concur in, the bar-
gain.
60
Federal procedure distinguishes between pre-sentence and post-
sentence guilty plea withdrawals. 61 The current standard for pre-
setence withdrawals was articulated by the United States Supreme
Court by way of dicta in Kercheval v. United States: 82
The court in the exercise of its discretion will permit one
accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial
if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair
and just.8 3
After sentence, however, a court may withdraw a guilty plea only
upon a showing of "manifest injustice" to the defendant. 64 The
ant's counsel had told him concerning the plea and what the defendant,
whose credibility was questionable, had relied on in entering the plea, the
decision was labeled as sui generis.
57. 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
58. Id. at 30-31, 265 A.2d at 647-48 (dissenting opinion).
59. Id. at 30, 265 A.2d at 647 (dissenting opinion).
60. Id. at 32, 264 A.2d at 648 (dissenting opinion).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (d) provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sen-
tence is suspended; but to correct a manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and per-
mit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
See also Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); Note, Pre-
Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Courts, 40 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 759 (1965).
62. 274 U.S. 220 (1927). Decided before Federal Rule 32(d), the case
has been carried over by cases decided after the rule was adopted. See,
e.g., Nagelberg v. United States, 377 U.S. 266 (1964); Everett v. United
States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Nigro, 262 F.2d 783
(3d Cir. 1959).
63. 274 U.S. at 224.
64. FED. R. Clam. P. 32(d). See also DeGregory v. United States, 382
distinction ostensibly affords a better opportunity for a defendant
to protect his right to trial by petitioning the trial court to with-
draw before sentencing, while avoiding motions for withdrawal
based solely upon dissatisfaction with a sentence already imposed.65
The granting of a pre-sentence motion is solely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.6  A defendant who enters a plea of guilty
accepted by the trial court has no absolute right to withdraw that
plea. 7 However, considering the slight chance of prejudice to the
government's case, it has been urged that motions to withdraw pleas
of guilty made before sentence be liberally granted." The issue on
appeal continues to be whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying withdrawal. 69
A pre-sentence motion to withdraw will be denied if the govern-
ment can show that substantial prejudice will result to its case if
the defendant is given a trial.70 For example, in Farnsworth v.
Sanford71 the government, in reliance upon the defendant's guilty
plea, dismissed fifty-two witnesses previously subpoenaed from
throughout the country. When the defendant attempted to with-
draw his plea, the whereabouts of many witnesses was unknown.
It was held that under these circumstances there was no abuse of
discretion in denying the defendant leave to withdraw his plea of
nolo contendere. 72 Time is an important factor in this regard since
the longer a defendant waits to file his motion, the greater the
U.S. 850 (1965); Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954); Sherburne v.
United States, 433 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Shneer, 194
F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1952).
65. See Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963):
This distinction rests upon practical considerations important to
the proper administration of justice. Before sentencing the incon-
venience to the court and prosecution resulting from a charge of
plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in pro-
tecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of
guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence the accused might
be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential pun-
ishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence was unexpectedly
severe. The result would be to undermine respect for the courts
and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the
sentencing process.
Id. at 671.
66. See, e.g., Oksanen v. United States, 362 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1966);
Smith v. United States, 359 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1966).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970);
Byes v. United States, 402 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Ptomey,
366 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1966).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1969);
Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Poole v. United
States, 250 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
69. 8A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 32-07 (2d ed. 1968); United States v.
Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1969). See, e.g., United States v. Hughes,
325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Phelan v. Brierly, 312 F.
Supp. 350 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
70. 8A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 32-08 (2d ed. 1968); United States v.
Stayton, 408 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1969); Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375
(5th Cir. 1940).
71. 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940).
72. Id. at 377.
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chances that the government will not be able to present a case
against him if he is permitted to go to trial.
78
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
inter alia that a trial court,
may not accept a (guilty) plea without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
7 4
In most instances careful compliance with Rule 11 will remove
grounds for any subsequent attack on the validity of the plea.
75
Any representations on the part of the defendant at the time his
plea is accepted that he understands the significance of his plea and
is satisfied of his guilt cannot be lightly disregarded by the circuit
court.7 As under the Pennsylvania rule, the federal courts have
held that if it appears that the defendant knew what he was doing
and there is no evidence of force, mistake, or ignorance, with-
drawal should be denied.1
7
The difference between the Pennsylvania and federal rules is
one of semantics. Even before sentence, under the federal rule, dis-
appointment with the prospective penalty to be imposed will not
sustain the burden required to withdraw a guilty plea. 78 Both rules
place a heavy responsibility on defense counsel to insure that the
defendant plead guilty only if he is in fact guilty of the offense
charged.79 If defense counsel is derelict in this responsibility, as
where he advises a plea of guilty before interviewing witnesses to
ascertain the possibility of a defense, the defendant should be al-
lowed to withdraw his plea.8 0 Under these circumstances, the inef-
fectiveness of counsel vitiates the voluntariness of the plea itself.,'
However, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Common-
wealth v. Culbreth,2 the exercise of mistaken judgment by counsel
in regard to the trial court's possible acceptance of sentence recoin-
73. United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 286 (3d Cir. 1965).
74. FED. R. Cinm. P. 11.
75. Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); Barley v.
United States, 312 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1963); Gundlack v. United States, 262
F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1958).
76. See United States v. Briscoe, 428 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1970).
77. Ptomey v. United States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
78. See, e.g., White v. United States, 354 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Fina, 289 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Compare Melnick v. United
States, 356 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVal-
lee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
79. See United States v. Rodgers, 389 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968).
80. Id.
81. Compare United States v. Briscoe, 428 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1970) with
In re Parker, 423 F.2d 1021 (8th Cir. 1970).
82. 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970).
mendations is not sufficient ground for a motion to withdraw un-
der federal rule 32 (d) .11
Application of the Federal and Pennsylvania procedural rules
renders essentially the same result. In either case, the trial court's
refusal to allow withdrawal will be reversed only where an abuse
of discretion is shown. This proposition was substantiated by
Judge Hannum of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in United States Ex Rel. Culbreth v. Rundle.8 4 In
an opinion denying habeas corpus relief he stated:
In both the federal and state courts the withdrawal of a
plea of guilty is a matter that is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion or error of law.8 5
This opinion was written in response to a petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed by Culbreth after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided the principal case of this Note.
IV. THE A.B.A. MIimUM STANDARDS-
(PLEAS OF GUILTY) § 2.1
The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice has formulated a standard dealing with the
withdrawal of guilty pleas which is quite similar in its language
to the federal approach.88 The ABA Minimum Standards provide
that unless a "manifest injustice" has been shown, a defendant may
not withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right8 7 The trial court
may, however, before trial at its discretion allow a defendant to
withdraw his plea for "any fair or just reason," unless the prosecu-
tion has been prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.88
The ABA Minimum Standards, however, fail to set forth any cri-
terion for determining when a "fair and just" reason has been pre-
sented. As in the Pennsylvania and federal court rules, the final
decision is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. It is sub-
mitted that reversals on appeal would be as infrequent under an ap-
plication of this rule as they have been under both the federal and
Pennsylvania rules.
The ABA Minimum Standards provide two requirements which
must be met before withdrawal of a guilty plea must be allowed.
First, the motion for withdrawal must be timely made.8 9 Second,
the withdrawal must be necessary to correct "a manifest injustice. '9o
83. United States v. Briscoe, 428 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1970); cf. Parker v.
N.C. 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
84. 320 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
85. Id. at 1053.
86. Compare, ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR C miUNAL JusTIcE, PLEAS
OF GUILTY § 2.1 (Approved Draft 1968) with FED. R. Cemi. P. 32 (d).
87. ABA MINIum STANDARDS FOR CemwAL JusTIcE, PLEAs or GurLTY






In further defining the first of the above requirements, the
Standard provides that a motion for withdrawal need not necessarily
be made subsequent to judgment or sentence to be timely.9 1 The
motion must be made with due diligence and, as the commentators
point out, the fact that the motion comes after sentence may have
a bearing upon whether the motion is timely.92 For example, if the
defendant alleges that the prosecuting attorney failed to request the
sentence agreed upon in a plea agreement, it is reasonable to expect
the defendant to file a motion to withdraw immediately upon learn-
ing of the prosecuting attorney's inaction.
In defining "manifest injustice" the ABA Minimum Standards
provide:
(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injus-
tice whenever the defendant proves that:
(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed to him by constitution, statute or rule;
(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defend-
ant or a person authorized to so act in his behalf;
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without
knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually
imposed could be imposed;
(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence conces-
sions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prose-
cuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose these conces-
sions as promised in the plea agreement; or
(5) he did not receive the charge or sentence conces-
sions contemplated by the plea agreement concurred in by
the court, and he did not affirm his plea after being advised
that the court no longer concurred and being called upon
to either affirm or withdraw his plea.
3
The above propositions are all currently adhered to by both
Pennsylvania and Federal Courts. The standards for determining
when a plea of guilty should not be allowed to stand, set forth by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Scoleri94 are
roughly equivalent to the examples of manifest injustice presented
by the drafters of the ABA Minimum Standards. Barring these
clear and readily identifiable circumstances, all three approaches
allow the trial judge wide discretion to deal with the defendant's
withdrawal request as his own predispositions dictate. The deci-
sions are not uniform and many times are contradictory. It is
91. Id.
92. Comments, ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS
OF GUILTY § 2.1 p. 55 (Approved Draft 1968)-.
93. ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY
§ 2.1 (ii) (Approved Draft 1968).
94. 415 Pa 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).
clear, however, that for the most part, a trial judge's decision to dis-
allow withdrawal will be upheld on appellate review.
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